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Abstract
The paper analyzes the problem of protocol coordination between two
ﬁrms, where one ﬁrm has private information about its own protocol.
The institutional characteristics of the market and the class of strategies
adopted by the ﬁrms admit multiple equilibria in the market. Of these,
one particular equilibrium has an interior information revelation cuto 
for the ﬁrm with private information. This demonstrates that the market
might not be able to “kill bad ideas”, but it does “reward good ideas”. In
contrast, the institutional design of the committee ensures that the same
class of strategies gives rise to a unique equilibrium in the committee,
with the informed ﬁrm revealing all private information. The committee
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ﬁrms and is robust to an exit option. The market game result holds for a
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11 Introduction
In a large number of industries marked with network features, such as telecom-
munication, internet, software, hardware etc., compatibility among components
of the network is essential for completing transactions. For example, the comple-
tion of a telephone call requires that there be end-to-end connectivity between
the phones and the infrastructure supporting the call. Consumers derive utility
from the entire system, rather than from an individual component of the net-
work. The requirement for compatibility is the driving force for standardization
of protocols for conducting transactions. However, di erent network industries
vary in the degree of compatibility desired among components and this results
in di erent routes preferred for standardization.
Given that a ﬁrm has developed some technology, and wishes to push this
as the industry standard, what is the best approach? In this paper, we set
out to answer this question. The actual process leading to standardization is a
relatively neglected issue in the vast literature analyzing the incentives of ﬁrms
for standardization and its welfare implications. One early exception is Farrell
and Saloner (1988), which investigates the comparative performance of formal
committees, markets and hybrid mechanisms in systems markets in achieving
standardization. Relative to the market mechanism, the formal committee out-
performs in its ability to achieve standardization. Farrell(1996) revisits the
problem of coordination in a more realistic scenario of private information about
quality of protocols. The question that remains unanswered is the incentive of
participants in the standards process to reveal their private information.
The present paper compares di erent institutions (formal committees, mar-
ket and hybrid mechanisms) in network industries along two dimensions: in
terms of attaining standardization of protocol and providing incentives for reve-
lation of private information. The protocol coordination problem is analyzed in
the presence of one-sided asymmetric information. In a two-player game, ﬁrm
has an incompatible preferred protocol that it would like to be chosen as the
standard. However, ﬁrm 1 is fully informed about both the private beneﬁts from
both the protocols, but ﬁrm 2 knows only its own private beneﬁts. This is true
of a large number of empirical examples of standardization1. At any given point
1 One moot example of this is the Enhanced Data rates over GSM Evolution (EDGE)
2of time, there are only a ﬁnite number of new ideas that accrue from research
and development, and it is rare that many participants in the coordination game
have private information.
This paper contributes to the literature on standardization in two ways.
First, this paper investigates the incentives for ﬁrm 1 with private information
( ) to reveal its information in a two-period protocol coordination problem,
with exogenous coordination beneﬁts c. The committee game admits a unique
equilibrium in the cuto  class of mixed strategies with complete unraveling of
private information. Though high types of   would like to reveal their types, the
low types would not like to reveal. However, with high valuation ﬁrms revealing
their information, in any candidate interior cuto  equilibrium, ﬁrms that are
close to, but to the left of the cuto , will also want to reveal their private in-
formation. Else, ﬁrm 2 will believe that   = 0. Thus, private information held
by ﬁrm 1 unravels. Further, there are two paths to the second period due to
the institutional structure of the committee, which is designed to encourage co-
ordination. This ensures that ﬁrm 2, without private information (with private
beneﬁt b), to base its belief about the other ﬁrm’s average type over a small
range of   which is assumed to be uniformly distributed over [0,1]. As a re-
sult, ﬁrm 2 plays more aggressively in the committee enjoying a higher expected
payo  than in the market. The latter game, in contrast, has three equilibria:
two pure bandwagon formation and one interior information revelation cuto 
equilibrium in which ﬁrm 1 does not reveal all information. This is driven by
the institutional design of the market, whereby there is only one single path to
the second period. Firm 2 belief about ﬁrm 1’s type is based over an average  
imputed over a larger range. Thus, ﬁrm 2 plays less aggressively in the market
than in the committee.
More interesting is the relation between the payo s to the ﬁrms and co-
ordination probability. The latter is higher in the committee. However, this
comes at a higher cost in the form of its reduced ability to reward high type
proposal by Ericsson at a GSM meeting for increasing the throughput of data over the GPRS
system in mobile phones. All the committee members were aware about the features of
the incumbent technology. Ericsson revealed to the GSM committee participants private
information about EDGE. Simulations revealed by Ericsson portended tripling of data rates
compared to the incumbent technology.
3 s. The second important result of the paper is that the market payo  out-
performs the committee payo  for ﬁrm 1 above a certain cuto  value of  .
This result is in sharp contrast to Farrell and Saloner (1988) and it provides
a theory for the choice of institutions for standardization in di erent network
industries. The prediction of this paper is that for values of  
c higher than a
certain cuto  value, ﬁrm 1 will prefer the market for protocol standardization.
This is in line with most of the anecdotal evidence of successful standardization
in network industries. For example, wireless telecommunications, with a high
level of compatibility requirement among di erent network components, have
in fact almost always chosen the committee route for standardization, whereas
others with lower levels of coordination beneﬁts, such as email, have followed
the market bandwagon formation for standardization.
In a more general context, the central result of the paper is that the market
mechanism might not successfully “kill bad ideas” relative to the committee,
but it does seem to be able to “reward good ideas” (with  
c higher than the the
cuto ) better than the formal committee. Intuitively, one might expect that the
market bandwagon with little allowances made for coordination would punish
“bad ideas” severely and commensurately reward ”good ideas”. However, the
result of our model is that the market seems to perform the latter task better
than the former. Some ”bad ideas” do have a positive probability as being
accepted in the market. This result is driven by the compulsions of mixed
strategy equilibria and the institutional design of the market. As there is only
a single path to the second period, ﬁrm 2 is less aggressive and low values of  
c
enjoy a positive probability of being chosen as the standard.
The necessary assumptions and the formulation of the structure and timing
of the committee and market games is detailed in section 2 of this paper. The
perfect Bayesian equilibria of these games involve mixed strategies employed
by both the players. In particular, ﬁrm 1 is assumed to employ a cuto  point
based strategy for information revelation and protocol coordination. Section 3
of the paper tests the robustness of the two-period committee game information
unraveling result in a single period exogenous coordination committee game.
Exogenous coordination shows that the cost of endogenous committee based
coordination results in lower payo s to both the ﬁrms, as noted earlier. Section 4
4of the paper generalizes the market and committee game results for any arbitrary
number of ﬁrms. As the nature of the general n player game is that of a weak-
link game, overall coordination falls with large n. Section 5 concludes. The
mathematical proofs are consigned to the Appendices in section 6.
2 Problem Formulation
2.1 Assumptions
Two ﬁrms, with two incompatible protocols A and B, are playing a simultaneous
game of coordination. Firm 1 prefers protocol A, which gives it a private beneﬁt
of  , whereas ﬁrm 2 gets a private beneﬁt of b from its preferred protocol B. Firm
2’s beneﬁt b is common knowledge, but ﬁrm 1’s beneﬁt   is not. Firm 2 only
knows that   is distributed uniformly over [0,1]. For comparability between A
and B, we assume that E  = b = 1
2. Both ﬁrms would like to coordinate jointly
on their preferred protocol as the standard. Pure beneﬁts from coordination is
captured by c and  x is the probability of coordination on protocol x  {A,B}.
As in Farrell and Saloner (1988), c > b and c >    . This assumption captures
the fact that in network industries, the most important factor is compatibility
and coordination of protocols. Di erent network industries di er in the extent
to which c matters for completing transactions. It is very high in some net-
work industries, like telecommunication, and less strong in some others, like the
internet. The ratio  
c is crucial for explaining why some industries prefer the
committee route whereas others follow the market-mediated standardization.
The compatibility beneﬁts c, E  and b are assumed to be mutually inde-
pendent of each other. There are no side payments between the players. Most
importantly, this paper investigates only ex-ante institutions for standardiza-
tion. Ex-post mechanisms for standardization, like converters, are ignored2.
Firm 1, with private information, is assumed to present certifable hard ev-
idence if it decides to reveal its private information. Further, the uninformed
ﬁrm 2 is assumed to believe that ﬁrm 1 is of the lowest type if it does not reveal
its private information. The perfect Bayesian equilibria of these games involve
2As discussed in Farrell and Saloner (1992), converters might reduce welfare from standards
rather than improve it
5mixed strategies employed by both the players. In particular, ﬁrm 1 is assumed
to employ a cuto  point based strategy for information revelation and protocol
coordination.
2.2 Institutional design of the market and the committee
There is no coordination by ﬁat in the market. The coordination mechanism in
the market is modeled along the lines of Farrell and Saloner (1988). In a two
period simultaneous move game, if a ﬁrm unilaterally adopts its own protocol
in period 1, then there is no further scope for coordination by that ﬁrm. A
standard can still arise if the other ﬁrm switches to this ﬁrm’s bandwagon. If
both ﬁrms wait and do not adopt their protocols in period 1, they get another
chance in period 2 to coordinate on a single protocol. If both ﬁrms insist on their
own protocols in period 1, no coordination is achieved. Firms do no get another
chance to coordinate in period 2. There is no discounting and payo s accrue
only at the end of period 2. Payo s from the two periods are not aggregated.
The market lacks a separate instrument for information revelation. The
very act of adoption of A by ﬁrm 1 reveals information about  . It is assumed
that this information comes with hard evidence. If ﬁrm 1 goes the market
route to adopt A, then equity funding for A typically requires it to disclose
private information about  . In such instances, the ﬁrm releases hard evidence
in the form of research reports and simulation results about expected quality
and beneﬁts from the proposed protocol.
The committee is a formal non-market institution for achieving standardiza-
tion. Empirical evidence shows that much of the standards in wireless telecom
has been achieved through formal committees. As Farrell and Saloner(1988)
note, every year hundreds of technical experts ﬂy to di erent parts of the world
to participate in formal committees for standardization. Participation in a single
committee may cost upto USD 2,50,000 annually (Datamation, 1989) and upto
1 percent of revenues of ﬁrms (Swann, 1990). Furthermore, formal committee-
based standards take around four to ﬁve years to be completed as an average
(Kolodziej, 1988).
Despite its costs and slow nature of achieving coordination, Farrell and Sa-
loner(1988) show that it does better than the market mechanism in achieving
6coordination. However, this result holds in the absence of private information
among the committee members. In this paper, the committee is modeled as an
institution that not only facilitates coordination on protocol but also provides
a forum for ﬁrm 1 to reveal its private information. The information revelation
stage precedes the coordination stage. Though not in the context of network
industries, the papers of Coughlan (2000), Doraszelski et al (2003) and Schulte
(2006) model committees which have an explicit stage of sharing private in-
formation. Further, these papers deal with private information about a public
good, whereas in our paper, the information asymmetry is regarding a private
good. In the information revelation stage, ﬁrm 1 decides whether to reveal its
private information about   in the committee by presenting hard evidence in
the form of formal proposals. This is the norm in most technical standard-
ization committees, where written proposals contain detailed simulation results
which are vetted by specialists. The literature on information revelation about
a public good in formal committees in non-network industries generally does
not model presentation of hard evidence, the exception being Schulte (2006).
In our two-period committee game, ﬁrm 1 decides whether or not to reveal  
at the beginning of period 1 prior to the coordination game. If ﬁrm 1 has not
revealed   in period 1, it gets another chance to reveal information in period 2
before the ﬁrms coordinate on protocol.
The committee as an institution encourages coordination. The coordination
mechanism in our committee is similar to that modeled by Farrell and Saloner
(1988). If the players cannot agree on a standard in period 1 (both the ﬁrms
either insist on their protocols or both the ﬁrms concede in period 1), the com-
mittee meets again in period 2. As in the market, if both ﬁrms concede in
period 1, they get another chance to coordinate on protocol in period 2. In
contrast to the market, if both ﬁrms insist on their protocols in period 1, the
game does not terminate. The committee meets again in period 2 to coordinate
on a standard. However, it should be noted that the committee might still fail
to achieve coordination even at the end of period 2.
72.3 Structure and timing of the market and committee
games
The structure and timing of the market game is as follows: in period 1, ﬁrm 1
decides whether to “adopt A” or “wait”. The action of adoption of A reveals  .
Simultaneously, ﬁrm 2 decides whether to “adopt B” or “wait”. If both ﬁrms
choose to “adopt”, the game terminates. The game goes to period 2 only if
both ﬁrms choose to “wait”. In period 2, ﬁrm 1 decides whether to “stick to A”
wait “switch to B” and ﬁrm 2 simultaneously decides whether to “stick to B”
or“switch to A”.
The payo s of the market game  m in the two periods is summarized tables 1
and 2. It should be noted that period 1 and period 2 payo s are not aggregated.
Payo s accrue at the end of the game.
Wait Adopt B
Adopt A   + c, c ,b
Wait  1
2, E  2
2 c, b + c
Table 1: Period 1 payo  in the market game  m
Switch to A Stick to B
Stick to A   + c, c ,b
Switch to B 0,0 c, b + c
Table 2: Period 2 payo  of the market game  m
In the committee game  c, in each period there are two separate stages:
information revelation by ﬁrm 1 (reveal   or not reveal) and deliberation on
protocol coordination. After the ﬁrst stage in period 1, the coordination stage
allows the ﬁrms either to “insist” or to “concede”. If ﬁrm 1 does not reveal
its   in period 1, it again gets an opportunity in period 2 to reveal its private
information. Subsequently, in the coordination stage, the actions of the ﬁrms
are either“stick to preferred protocol” or “switch to the other protocol”.
The payo s of ﬁrst period of the committee game  c is summarized in table
3. The last period payo  matrix is common to both the committee and the
market.
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2 c, b + c
Table 3: Period 1 payo  of the committee game  c
Figure 1: Market Game
2.4 Strategies in the market and committee games
We are looking for equilibria in mixed strategies3. Firm 2 plays a mixed strategy:
q1 = Pr{Firm 2 adopts B Game is in period 1}
q2 = Pr{Firm 2 insists on B Game is in period 2}. Firm 1 is assumed to employ
a cuto -point based strategy in the market game. We use the cuto  point-based
strategy for ﬁrm 1 because it arises naturally in this kind of coordination games
with asymmetric information. Due to the institutional design of the market, the
protocol coordination cuto  coincides with the information revelation cuto . In
period 1, ﬁrm 1 “adopts A” with probability p1( ) = 1 i       R
and in period 2, ﬁrm 1 sticks to A with probability p2( ) = 1 i      ˆ  . The
market cuto  strategy is summarized in ﬁgure 1.
In the committee, ﬁrm 1’s information revelation cuto  is separate from its
coordination cuto . In ﬁrst stage of period 1, ﬁrm 1 reveals   i       R. If
3Mixed strategy equilibrium is payo -dominated by pure strategy equilibria in both the
committee and the market games. However, as noted by Farrell and Saloner (1988), mixed
strategy equilibrium, as opposed to equilibria in pure strategies, allow for the possibility
of coordination failure. Furthermore, mixed strategy equilibrium risk dominates the pure
strategy equilibria.
9Figure 2: Committee Game
ﬁrm 1 reveals   in the ﬁrst stage, then it plays insist with probability p1 in the
second stage. Otherwise, it insists on A with probability p1( ) = 1 i      ˆ  1.
In a similar manner, ﬁrm 1 reveals   i      ˘  R in the ﬁrst stage of period 2.
If ﬁrm 1 reveals  , then it plays insist with probability p2 in the second stage.
Otherwise, it insists on A with probability p2( ) = 1 i      ˆ  . The committee
cuto  strategy is summarized in ﬁgure 2.
2.5 Equilibria in the market and committee games
Using the assumptions and the structure and timing mentioned above, we char-
acterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the market and the committee games.
2.5.1 Market game
Proposition 1. The market game has multiple equilibria, two of which involve
pure bandwagon formation for either protocol and a third interior cuto  equilib-
rium.
Proof. The proof is summarized in Appendix 1.
The pure bandwagon formation equilibria are characterized by both ﬁrms
coordinating on either protocol A or protocol B, with equilibrium payo s   + c
or c to ﬁrm 1 and c or b + c to ﬁrm 2.




ˆ   =
(c b)
2c ·  R
q1 = c+ˆ  
2(c  R)+c+ˆ   q2 =0 .5+
(c b)
4c2 ·  R
10The equilibrium payo s are:
 1 =  {    [0,ˆ  )}[(1   q1)cq2 + cq1]
+ {    [ˆ  , R)}[(1   q1)(  + (1   q2)c)+cq1]
+ {    [ R,1]}[  + (1   q1)c]
 2 = (1    R)c +(  R   ˆ  )[(1   q1)(1   q2)c
+(1   q1)q2 · b + q1(c + b)] + ˆ  (b + c)
The equilibrium coordination probabilities are:
 A =
1   q1     ( R,1]
(1   q1)(1   q2)     (ˆ  , R]
0     [0, ˆ  ]
 B =
0     ( R,1]
q1     (ˆ  , R]
q1 + (1   q1)q2 if     [0, ˆ  ]
Some features of this interior cuto  equilibrium are worth noting.
Lemma 1. q2 > 0.5 >q 1 for all values of c.
Firm 2 plays a more aggressive strategy in period 2 than in period 1 as
q2 >q 1. The reason is that if the game goes to period 2, ﬁrm 2 updates its
belief about ﬁrm 1 from     [0,1] to     [0, R], where  R < 1.
Lemma 2.  B >  A        R.
For      R, ﬁrm 1 waits in period 1 with probability 1 and the game goes
to period 2 with probability 1   q1. In period 2, ﬁrm 2 plays a more aggressive
strategy so that probability of coordination is higher on protocol B than on A.
Lemma 3. Both q1 and q2 are decreasing in c.
As coordination beneﬁt increases, ﬁrm 2 plays a less aggressive strategy.
Lemma 4. Both ˆ   and  R are increasing in c
11As the coordination beneﬁt increases, ﬁrm 1 plays a less aggressive strategy.
Most importantly, the complete unraveling of private information does not occur
in this interior cuto  equilibrium. This result arises mainly due to the nature
of beliefs of ﬁrm 2, the nature of equilibrium strategies and the two period time
horizon of the game. In this two-period setup, the mixed strategy equilibrium
allows ﬁrm 1 to be able to form the bandwagon in favor of A with probability
(1   q1) < 1 above the cuto  point  R in period 1 and (1   q1)(1   q2) < 1
for values of     (ˆ  , R) in period 2. Complete revelation of information even
for very high values of   does not compensate ﬁrm 1 with the certainty that
the market standard will be in favor of A. Whether an interior information
revelation cuto  remains as the number of periods increase is an open question.
2.5.2 Committee Game
The committee game admits a unique equilibrium with complete unraveling of
private information in the class of strategies analyzed.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium in the committee game is unique in the class
of cuto  strategies, with ﬁrm 1 revealing its private information.
Proof. Suppose that ﬁrm 1 reveals   for      R in period 1 and for     ˘  R in
period 2. Detailed calculations in Appendix 2 show that  R = ˘  R = 0 implying
that ﬁrm 1 reveals all private information in both periods. This equilibrium is
unique as this result holds even when we solve the game with the contrarian
strategy that ﬁrm 1 reveals   for      R in period 1 and     ˘  R in period 2. In
that case, ˘  R =  R = 1. This implies that ﬁrm 1 reveals all information in both
periods.
The intuition for the “unraveling” of private information is that high valua-
tion ﬁrm 1 have an incentive to reveal  , otherwise ﬁrm 2 will impute an average
valuation and play more aggressively. However, by the same token, low valua-
tion ﬁrms may not want to reveal information. However, with high valuation
ﬁrms revealing their information, in any “candidate interior cuto  equilibrium”,
ﬁrms that are close to, but to the left of the cuto , will also want to reveal their
private information. Thus, private information held by ﬁrm 1 unravels.
12At the end of period 2 in the committee game, equilibrium payo s are  1 =
(c+ )(3c  )
4c and  2 =
(c+b)(3c b)
4c . Firm 1 insists on A with probability p1 = p2 =
p = b+c
2c > 0.5 and ﬁrm 2 insists on B with probability q1 = q2 = q =  +c
2c > 0.5.
Overall probability of coordination is   = p(1   q)+q(1   p)+q(1   q)(2p2  
2p + 1) + p(1   p)(2q2   2q + 1).
Lemma 5. q is increasing in  .
This arises due to the nature of the mixed strategy equilibrium in both
periods. Even if ﬁrm 1 reveals its type in the last period, then
 1( )=p{(1   q)(  + c)+q ·  } + (1   p) · (qc)
For 0 < p < 1, q will increase with  .
Lemma 6. p and q are decreasing in c.
As c increases, both ﬁrms play less aggressively.
Lemma 7. For a given value of  ,   
 c is positive.
As the beneﬁts of coordination increase relative to private beneﬁts, overall
probability of coordination increases.
Proposition 3. The committee game is robust to an exit option: All informa-
tion is revealed even in a hybrid committee game with an exit option.
Proof. In this hybrid game, the ﬁrms decide in stage 1 whether or not to join
the committee. If both ﬁrms decide to join the committee, then the usual two
period committee game is played. Otherwise, if one ﬁrm decides to exit while
the other ﬁrm prefers to go the committee route, the assumption is that the
bandwagon forms in favor of the ﬁrm playing the exit option. If both ﬁrms
choose to exit, they simply collect their private beneﬁts from their respective
protocols and lose out on the beneﬁts of coordination. The ﬁrst stage payo  is
shown in table 4.
If both ﬁrms choose “committee”, then the payo s  c
i   i = (1,2) are the
payo s from the usual two period committee game  c. The relevant question is
whether the ﬁrst stage exit option changes ﬁrm 1’s incentives to reveal its private
13Committee Exit
Exit   + c, c ,b
Committee  c
1,E c
2 c, b + c
Table 4: Stage 1 payo s of the hybrid game  h
information in this hybrid committee game  h. As sketched in Appendix 3, ﬁrm
1 reveals all information in the committee in this hybrid game.
Hard evidence, the nature of the strategies used by the ﬁrms, the nature of
beliefs held by ﬁrm 2 and the mutual independence of c and the private beneﬁts
drive this result. As ﬁrm 1 presents only hard evidence, it cannot blu  about
its private information. High types of ﬁrm 1 would always want to reveal its
type in order to increase its chances of forming the standard, given that  , b
and c are independent of each other. If it does not reveal  , then ﬁrm 2 believes
that ﬁrm 1’s valuation is of the lowest type in the range [0,1]. Therefore, ﬁrm
1 does not have any incentive to hide information even in a committee with an
exit option.
2.6 Comparative performance of institutions
Figure 3 compares the equilibrium payo s from the committee game and the
interior cuto  equilibrium in the market game. Firm 2’s expected payo  is
higher in the committee than in the market. More importantly, ﬁrm 1’s market
payo  outperforms the committee payo  only for values of   >  x(c). For
c = 2,  x =0 .628. The interesting implication for this result is that ﬁrm 1
with value of   >  x(c) will be discouraged from joining the committee. The
market seems to“rewards good ideas” better than the committee.This result
is not only in marked contrast of Farrell and Saloner (1988), it explains some
interesting instances of standardization in di erent network industries. Mobile
phones and email addresses are the two common identiﬁers of any individual
in most countries at present, and interestingly the successful standardization
of these technologies was driven by two di erent institutions. The “cellular
revolution” is a success story of committee-driven standards, whereas internet
email ﬂourished through a market-based bandwagon.
14Figure 3: Committee vs Market payo s
Successful standardization of the mobile air interface has resulted in mobile
phones becoming ubiquitous even in developing countries4.The mobile story
is the result of the massive coordination undertaken by the GSM committee
founded by the CEPT (European Union) in 1982. Pre-GSM, there were a num-
ber of incompatible wireless telecommunication protocols such as Digital AMPS
(US) and NMT (Scandinavia) coexisting in the market. Any mobile phone op-
erating on a particular standard required speciﬁc network equipment to support
any telephone call. The result was that an early mobile phone like the Motorola
DynaTac 8000X (AMPS) cost as much as USD 3995 (1980 prices). The GSM
standard has resulted in very low handset costs (the cost of a Nokia 1150 phone
to a mere USD 40 at current prices) and low costs of service. The GSM story is
by no means unique; other successful standards by the committee route include
Universal Serial Bus (by computer peripheral manufacturers), MPEG/JPEG
(for still and motion picture digitization), etc. These are industries where a
large number of independent components have to function in tandem with each
4In 2007, the worldwide revenue from text messaging was USD 100 billion; more than the
revenues from Hollywood, global music sales and sales of PC and console games in the United
States combined.
15other, giving rise to very high compatibility beneﬁts. In terms of our model,
this would imply that  
c is quite low in these industries. It is unlikely that any
ﬁrm would have a value of   high enough relative to the high value of c in this
industry. In contrast to the GSM standard in wireless telephony, the SMTP
(Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) standard used for 95 percent of the world’s
email tra c was a market-driven process. In fact, in the US government under
the aegis of the ISO established the X.400 committee for electronic message
transfer in 1980. By 1992, when the complicated ﬁnal X.400 recommendation
was published, SMTP was already established as the standard for email in the
internet. A second stunning market success was the widespread adoption and
market-domination of Ethernet, vastly overshadowing its competitors (Token
Ring and Token Bus were promoted by IBM and GM respectively), due to its
simplicity and ease-of-use. The internet applications and Ethernet are examples
of high  
c.
Proposition 4. The ratio  
c determines the institution delivering standardiza-
tion of protocol. Higher is this ratio, the more likely it is that standardization
will be achieved through a market-based bandwagon. The lower the ratio, the
committee route is more likely.
Very high   relative to c is indicative of drastic change. Designing a formal
committee which will accomodate such a drastic change through a consensual
manner is practically very di cult. Such a drastic change in standards would
therefore appear through the market mechanism which does not require a con-
sensual approach for forming an industry standard.
2.7 Comparative Statics and Comparison of Results
There are two separate comparisons which warrant attention: comparing the
committee game results with the market game and within each game, comparing
the coordination e ect with the information e ect.
Regarding the ﬁrst comparison, coordination is higher in the committee game
than in the market game due their institutional structures. Essentially, there
are two di erent paths with two di erent histories to the second period in the
committee game, whereas there is only a single path to the second period in the
16market game. This gives the ﬁrms an additional path for coordination in the
committee game relative to the market. Further, the two di erent paths in the
committee game enable ﬁrm 2 to impute an average value of   over a smaller
range in the committee game in contrast to the market game. Coupled with an
o -the-equilibrium path belief that   = 0 if it does not reveal, no type of ﬁrm
1 can imitate to be a higher type by witholding information in the committee
game. As a natural consequence, the equilibrium mixed strategy q for ﬁrm 2
to “insist” is higher in the committee game than in either period of the market
game.
In an attempt to isolate the coordination e ect from the information e ect,
we construct a hypothetical game  i, which is identical to the market game
with the same information structure as the committee. We decompose the
payo  di erence in the committee game  c and the market game (interior cuto 
equilibrium) using  i:
 j( c)    j( m) = [ j( c)    j( i)] + [ j( i)    j( m)],j= {1,2}
The ﬁrst term captures the coordination e ect and the second term captures
the information e ect in the payo  di erence. For ﬁrm 1, the information e ect
outweighs the coordination e ect for   >  x(c). However, the coordination e ect
is always higher than the information e ect for ﬁrm 2.
The committee design in Farrell and Saloner (1988) performs better than
the market. The novelty of this result derives from the fact that the committee
functions more slowly than the market and yet it provides better results as far
as compatibility is concerned.These results rest on the absence of asymmetric
information among participants in the standards process and the lack of un-
certainty about the quality of the competing protocols. This paper changes
the framework of Farrell and Saloner (1988) by incorporating asymmetric in-
formation about quality. This brings about a signiﬁcant change in the results.
For ﬁrm 1, which has private information, the market mechanism outperforms
the committee for   >  x. Hence, the unambiguous superiority of the commit-
tee over the market as in Farrell and Saloner(1988), which is highly unrealistic
empirically, breaks down.
The result in our paper is more in line with Farrell (1996), which incorpo-
rates asymmetric information about protocol quality in the coordination game.
17The paper ﬁnds that even though the protocol with the highest quality is cho-
sen as the standard, the war of attrition committee design does not in general
outperform a market-like ‘random choice’ mechanism. Unlike our paper, Farrell
(1996) ﬁnds that when the quality variable is uniformly distributed over a closed
and bounded interval, the war of attrition never outperforms the random choice
mechanism. In our paper, the market mechanism outperforms the committee
only for values of   >  x even though   is uniformly distributed over [0,1]. Addi-
tionally, Farrell (1996) does not study the incentives for information revelation.
In our paper, within the cuto  class of strategies, the unique equilibrium of the
committee involves complete information revelation. In the market, however,
full information revelation does not occur in the interior cuto  equilibrium of
the market game  m.
3 Exogenous coordination: robustness of the com-
mittee game information unraveling result
The coordination mechanism in the committee  c is designed to be endogenous.
In most empirical examples, coordination involves an exogenous third party like
a government agency or an impartial industry forum. For instance, in the case
of wireless telecommunication, the IEEE (Institute of Electronic and Electrical
Engineers, an autonomous body of industry professionals) is actively involved
in the standardization process. In this section, we explore the robustness of the
information revelation result in a single period model with exogenous coordina-
tion. We consider the case where a government agency exogenously facilitates
coordination by deciding on one of the two incompatible protocols A or B in
case the ﬁrms cannot reach a consensus in a single period. In particular, in the
absence of consensus, the government intervenes with probability p and resolves
the conﬂict by choosing A as the standard with probability  . The timing of
this committee game  g is that the government agency declares ﬁrst declares p
and  . Firm 1 then decides whether or not to reveal  . Thereafter, the ﬁrms
play the coordination game, the payo  matrix for which is given in table 5.
where µ1 =  (  + c) + (1    )c, µ2 =  c) + (1    )(b + c)
Proposition 5. In the unique perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of  g, ﬁrm
18Switch to A Stick to B
Stick to A   + c, c pµ1 + (1   p) ,pµ2 + (1   p)b
Switch to B pµ1 + (1   p) ,pµ2 + (1   p)bc ,( b + c)
Table 5: Payo  of the committee game  g
1 reveals all private information given any p and   chosen by the exogenous
agency.
Proof. Following the same methodology as in the proofs of Propositions 1 and
2, the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game involves  R = 0 indicating
that ﬁrm 1 reveals its private information.
The reason for the unraveling of private information is the same as in the
committee game  c. The time dimension of the game has no impact on informa-
tion revelation as  c is a two-period game, whereas  g is a one-shot game. Firm
1’s payo  is  1 = p(  +c)+(1 p) +
z(z  )
(2z  ), where z = c p(  +c  ). Firm




b+2(c  )(b+c), where   = p(b+c b )+(1 p)b.
4 Extension to multiple players
The results of the market game holds qualitatively if the number of ﬁrms with a
preference for technology B increase. In the general case, suppose that there is
only one ﬁrm 1 with private information   about technology A and n identical
ﬁrms with a preference for technology B playing the coordination game for
two periods. We assume that the ﬁrms realize the coordination beneﬁts c only
if all of them can agree on a particular standard (A or B). Though this is a
very stringent requirement, there are a number of anecdotal evidence bearing
testimony to this condition 5. A more relaxed condition would entail c = c(n)
with c (n) > 0 and c(m) <c (n)  m<n . In our case, c(m) = 0 if m>0. As
shown in Appendix 4, at least one interior information revelation cuto  exists
in [0,1] as long as b
c
1
n 1 < (1 q1), where q1 is the probability with which ﬁrms
preferring B insist in period 1. For b =0 .5 and c = 2, this condition is satisﬁed
for n = 277. Relaxing our norm for standard formation (either c(m) > 0 for
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190 <m<n ) would ensure that an equilibrium would exist for larger values of
n. Further, as the number of ﬁrms increase, it is realistic to assume b and  
to be decreasing functions of n. As the number of ﬁrms increase, this leads
to a squeeze in the market share of individual ﬁrms. Thus, the condition for
existence is more easily met as the number of ﬁrms go up.
The committee game result is also robust to an increase in the number of
players who are informed. The unique equilibrium is that ﬁrm 1 reveals all
private information in each period, as shown in Appendix 5.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines two di erent routes to ex-ante standardization: the formal
committee system and the market bandwagon. An earlier result by Farrell and
Saloner(1988) ﬁnds that the slower committee game achieves better coordination
than the market. In our paper, we add another dimension of private information
to this coordination game. This modiﬁcation in the theoretical model changes
the results signiﬁcantly. The framework of this paper allows us to categorize
di erent network industries in terms of the ratio  
c. The higher this ratio, the
higher is the possibility that the market will succeed in standardizing proto-
col, as in the case of email protocol standardization. The lower the ratio, as
in wireless telecommunication, the larger is the prevalence of committee-driven
standards. The unique full information disclosure equilibrium in the committee
game is robust to an exit option (hybrid mechanism) and also with an in-built
exogenous coordination mechanism. The committee as well as the market game
results hold qualitatively for arbitrary number of players. However, the robust-
ness of the interior cuto  equilibrium to an increase in the number of periods is
agenda for future work.
6 Appendices
6.1 Appendix 1
Proposition 1. The market game has multiple equilibria, two of which involve
pure bandwagon formation for either protocol and a third interior cuto  equilib-
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Proof. Consider the ﬁrst equilibrium with bandwagon on A. Firm 1 adopts A
in period 1 and the game does not go to period 2. For 0 <q 1 < 1, we require
c = b, which contradicts our assumption that c > b. In order to maximize ﬁrm
2’s proﬁts E 2 = (1   q1)c + bq1, which is linear in q1, we should set q1 = 0,
which implies that ﬁrm 2 will switch to ﬁrm 1’s protocol A in period 1. This
equilibrium is supported by the o -the-equilibrium path belief that   = 0 if
some type of ﬁrm 1 deviates and the game goes to period 2. By similar logic
and o -the-equilibrium path beliefs, we get the other corner cuto  equilibrium
with bandwagon on B. A third equilibrium emerges in the 2-period market game
with an interior information revelation cuto . Then, with reference to the payo 
matrix in table 2, we get:
E 1( )=q2c + p( )[  + c   2q2c] (6.1.1)
E 2 = cE p( )+q2[b + c   2cE p( )] (6.1.2)
For 0 <p ( ) < 1, ˆ   = (2q2   1)c and for 0 <q 2 < 1, E p( )=b+c
2 . Firm




   R
ˆ  








c   b
4c2 ·  R (6.1.4)
  E 2




c   b
4c
·  R (6.1.5)
In period 1, from table 1,
MaxE 1





4c ·  R   c
2
E 2
1   2c
(6.1.6)
For 0 <q 1 < 1, we require  R <c . Now,
E 2 = (1    R)[(1   q1)c + q1b]+(  R   ˆ  )[(1   q1){(1   q2)c + q2b}
+ q1(b + c)] + ˆ  [(1   q1)q2 + q1](b + c)
Substituting the values of ˆ   = (2q2 1)c and q2 from (6.1.4), the coe cient of q1








21which must be set equal to zero for 0 <q 1 < 1. This gives us an interior value
of  R as  R =
2(c b)
3c b . As c    , we get the limiting value of  R as 2/3.
This analysis holds for all values of c >  R. It should be noted that it is
not possible for  R >cas in that case c < b. Hence, this is a valid interior
information revelation cuto . In this equilibrium, ﬁrm 2 believes that as long
as   >  R =
2(c b)
3c b , ﬁrm 1 will adopt A in the ﬁrst period itself.
6.2 Appendix 2
Proposition 2. The equilibrium in the committee game is unique in the class
of cuto  strategies, with ﬁrm 1 revealing its private information.
Proof. Suppose ﬁrm 1 reveals its type in the last period. With reference to the
payo  matrix shown in table 2, the equilibrium payo s are E 2
1(reveal) = 1
2( +
c)= +(1 q2((reveal))c and E 2
2(reveal) = 1
2(b+c), with q2((reveal)) =  +c
2c .
If ﬁrm 1 does not reveal its  , then ﬁrm 1’s strategy is a function of its type  .
Given ﬁrm 2’s updated belief that ﬁrm 1’s types are distributed uniformly over
[0, ˘  R], ﬁrm 1 ’s cuto  rule:      [0, ˆ  ), p2( ) = 0 and      (ˆ  , ˘  R], p2( ) = 1,
ﬁrm 1’s payo  is:
E 2
1 = cq2 + p2( )( ˘  R + c   2q2c)
For a mixed strategy equilibrium with 0 <p 2( ) < 1, we require ˆ   = 2(q2  1)c.
Firm 2’s expected payo , with the expectation taken over     [0, ˘  R], is:
E 2
2 = cE p2( )+q2[a + c   2cE p2( )]
For a mixed strategy equilibrium involving 0 <q 2 < 1, we require b+c
2c =
E p2( ). Using the value of ˆ   = 2(q2   1)c and simplifying, we get q2 = 1
2 +
c b
4c2 · ˘  R   E 2
2((notreveal)= ˘  R + (1   q2((notreveal))c = ˘  R + c
2   c b
4c · ˘  R.
In equilibrium, E 2
1(not reveal) = E 2
1(reveal).
E 2
1(not reveal)   E 2
1(reveal)] = [ ˘  R + (1   q2(reveal)]
  [ ˘  R + (1   q2(not reveal)c] (6.2.1)
E 2
1(not reveal)   E 2
1(reveal) =  
c + b
4c
· ˘  R (6.2.2)
From (6.2.1) it is obvious that in equilibrium q2((reveal)=q2((notreveal). Firm
2’s second period equilibrium strategy is independent of information revelation
22by ﬁrm 1. Further, unless ˘  R = 0, the expression in (6.2.2) is negative. However,
˘  R = 0 implies that all information is revealed in period 2. Therefore, on the
equilibrium path, ﬁrm 2 believes that all types of ﬁrm 1 will reveal information.
O -the-equilibrium path, we assume that ﬁrm 2 believes that ﬁrm 1 will not
reveal only if his type ( ) is very low, say   = 0. If   = 0, then E 2
1(not reveal) =
c
2   E 2
1(reveal) =  +c
2 . Therefore, even for   = 0, revealing is as good as not
revealing for ﬁrm 1.
In period 1, if ﬁrm 1 reveals its type in period 1, we can solve for the mixed
strategy equilibrium of the game described in table 3. It is easy to check that
q1 =  +c




4c +  +c
2 . If ﬁrm 1 does not reveal its type
in period 1, then the strategy of ﬁrm 1 becomes a function of its type and we
have to solve for the Bayes Nash equilibrium of the game with the payo  matrix
given in 3. Firm 2 believes that ﬁrm 1 will “insist on A” if     ( ˆ  1, R] and
“concede” if     [0, ˆ  1). The payo s of the ﬁrms are:
E 1 =
  + c
2
+ q1
c    
2
+ p1( )[
  + c
2










  cE p1( )] (6.2.4)
For a mixed strategy equilibrium, 0 <p 1( ) < 1, (6.2.3) requires that ˆ  1 =
(2q1   1)c. Further, (6.2.4)) implies that b+c
2c = E p1( ). Using the value
ˆ  1 = (2q1   1)c, mixed strategy equilibrium with 0 <q 1 < 1 in (6.2.3) requires
that q1 = 1
2 + c b
4c2 ·  R. With this value of q1, E 1
1(not reveal) = E 1
1(reveal)
implies  R+c q1((notreveal) R+c
2 =  R+c q1((reveal)    R+c
2  ( R+c)(c+
b) R = 0. This requires q1((reveal)=q1((notreveal) and  R = 0. Therefore,
all information is revealed in both periods. This equilibrium is supported by
o -the-equilibrium path belief of ﬁrm 2 that ﬁrm 1 will not reveal its   only if
  = 0.
6.3 Appendix 3
Proposition 3. The committee game is robust to an exit option: All informa-
tion is revealed even in a hybrid committee game with an exit option.
Proof. Firm 1’s strategy is to play “exit” for all values of   >  E, and to play
“committee” for all values of   below  E. If the game goes to the committee
23stage, then ﬁrm 1 reveals its information for all values of     ( R, E] and does
not reveal any information for all values of      R. If ﬁrm 1 does not reveal
any information in period 1 of the committee game, then it “insists on A” with
probability p( ) = 1 for all values of     (ˆ  , R] and with probability p( )=0
for all values of     [0, ˆ  ]. Suppose both ﬁrms choose to play “committee”. As
proved in the committee game  c, in the second period of this game, ﬁrm 1 re-
veals all information, with mixed strategy equilibrium payo s: E 2
1 =
2c( +c)




3c b . We now check whether ﬁrm 1 reveals all information
in period 1. If ﬁrm 1 does reveal all information in period 1, then its payo  is
E 1
1(reveal) = (1 q1)( +c)+q1(
(2c( +c))
(3c  ) + ), where q1 =
2c( +c) c(3c  )
4c( +c) (2c  )(3c  ).
If ﬁrm 1 does not reveal its information, then the Bayesian Nash equilibrium pay-
o  of ﬁrm 1 is E 1
1(not reveal) =  (0<  ˆ  )((1 q1)  2
1 +cq 
1)+ ( ˆ  )<   R)((1 
q1) (  + c)+ 2
1q 
1), where ˆ   =  R ·  
b+2 ,   = c  
(2c b)(b+c)
3c b and q 
1 =  1
 2,
 1 = c(cb4 2b3c2+5b2c3 4bc4+4c5  Rb4+3 Rcb3 5 Rb2c2+5b Rc3 2 Rc4
and  2 =2 b4c2  4b3c3 +10b2c4  8bc5 +8c6  5 Rcb4 +15 Rc2b3  25 Rb2c3 +





R. In equilibrium, the
marginal   must be indi erent between revealing and not revealing. In other
words, E 1
1(reveal) = E 1
1(not reveal) which requires  R = 0. Thus, ﬁrm 1
reveals all information in this hybrid committee game.
6.4 Appendix 4
Proposition 4. There exists at least one interior information revelation cuto 
in the market game with multiple players for low values of the ratio b
c for any






k be the probability that all the n players insist on B in
period k. Let ˜ sn
k =
 n
j=1(1   qn
k) be the probability that none of the n players
insist in period k. The jth ﬁrm’s aggregate proﬁt is:
E j = (1    R)( ˜ sn
1c + q
j
1b) + ( R   ˆ  )(sn
1(b + c)




2b)) + (ˆ     0)(sn
1(b + c)





24The ﬁrst order condition for maximization is:
  (1    R)˜ s
n 1
1 c + b +(  R   ˆ  )(b + c   z1)s
n 1
1
+ ˆ  (b + c   z2)s
n 1
1 = 0 (6.4.2)
  g( R,q
j
k;b,c,n) = 0 (6.4.3)
where, z1 = ˜ sn
2c + q
j




We can express ˆ   and q
j
2  j =1 ,...,n in terms of  R using the ﬁrst order
condition for optimization in period 2 for ﬁrm 1 and the jth ﬁrm:
E  
2 = p2( )[ ˜ sn
2(  + c) + (1   ˜ sn
2) ] + (1   p2( ))sn
2c
  ˆ   =( sn
2   ˜ sn
2)c
Max E  
j




2 (1   p2( ))c + q
j
2b + (1   q
j
2)p2( ) ˜ s
n 1
2 c]
  ˆ   =
( ˜ s
n 1
2 c   b) R
(s
n 1
2 + ˜ s
n 1
2 )c
For an interior  R   (0,1), we check whether g( R,q
j
k;b,c,n) < 0 in (6.4.3)
at  R = 0 and g( R,q
j
k;b,c,n) > 0 at  R = 1. The latter condition holds easily.
The reason is that z1 and z2 are weighted averages of b and c and is therefore
less than b + c and  R   ˆ  > 0. However, at  R = 0, g( R,q
j




n 1 < (1   q1) assuming that q
j
1 = q1  j. The lower is the ratio b
c, the more
likely is this condition to hold for a given value of n. If b is decreasing in n
and/or c is increasing in n, this condition holds for larger values of n.
6.5 Appendix 5
Proposition 5. There exists at least one equilibrium with full information rev-
elation in both periods in the committee game with n uninformed players.
Proof. With the same deﬁnitions for sk
n and ˜ sk
n as in the previous Appendix 4,
we can show that the in equilibrium in the second period Epi1((notreveal)) =
Epi1((reveal))   ˘  R+c (1 s2




n((reveal))c. This result is identical with the two-person
game, which yielded ˘  R = 0. Hence, there exists atleast one equilibrium with
˘  R = 0. Similarly, in the ﬁrst period, equilibrium requires s1
n((notreveal))c =
s1
n((reveal))c, indicating that  R = 0. Thus, there exists an equilibrium in both
periods with complete information revelation.
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